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ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE ARGUMENT PRIORITY OF THIS APPEAL IS 14. 
Defendants conclude that this appeal's "proper argument priority is 15" rather 
than 14. (Appellees' Brief at 1.) They argue, first, that "[t]his is, in fact, an appeal from a 
district court ruling and not directly from the decision of an administrative agency." 
(Appellees' Brief, cover.1) The relevant rule, however, does not require that an appeal 
be "directly from" an administrative decision: 
Cases shall be scheduled for oral argument in accordance with the 
following list of priorities: 
(14) Petitions to review administrative agency orders not included within 
other categories. 
(Utah R. of App. P. 29(b)(14).) This, of course, is just such a review, for "When a district 
court's review of an administrative decision is challenged on appeal and the district 
court's review was limited to the record before the board, 'we review the administrative 
decision just as if the appeal had come directly from the agency.'" Wells v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 
Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah Sec. Div., 744 P.2d 320, 321 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)). 
1
 Of course, this particular argument need not even be addressed in Reply, 
appearing as it does only on the cover of Defendants' brief, nowhere in the argument 
within. See Financial Bankcorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17 n.3 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (declining to consider appellant's argument when appellant's brief 
presented little analysis of issue and cited no authority in support of position). Given the 
placement of the argument on the very cover of the brief, however, Plaintiffs determined 
to respond anyway. 
1 
Defendants also argue that "[a] board of adjustment is not an administrative 
agency as defined in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act." (Appellees' Brief at 1.) A 
board of adjustment, however, is nevertheless an administrative agency, as Sandy City 
knows quite well. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 220-21 (Utah 
1992) (holding that Sandy's failure to appeal the rezoning at issue to the County board 
of adjustment did not preclude its bringing suit in district court, since the board lacked 
authority to hear the claim, and "the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not require 
one to initiate and participate in proceedings where an administrative agency clearly 
lacks jurisdiction." (emphasis added)).2 
Point 2 
THE BOARD'S AD HOC CREATION OF A 30-DAY MINIMUM RENTAL PERIOD IS 
ILLEGAL, ENTITLED NEITHER TO DEFERENCE NOR PRESUMPTION OF 
VALIDITY. 
A. The Board's Legal Ignorance Does Not Excuse its Application of an 
Improper Standard of Review. 
Rather than deny that the Board of Adjustment applied the wrong standard of 
review at its March 20, 1996, hearing, Defendants seek instead to reduce the Board's 
blunder to insignificance. Labeling it a "non-issue" (Appellees' Brief at 9), Defendants 
argue that since the members of Sandy City's board of adjustment are "without formal 
2
 The APA, in any case, is irrelevant. It does not apply to local agencies, see, 
e.g., Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
nor is this appeal brought thereunder; it is, rather, before the Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(l), which grants to "The Court of Appeals . . . appellate jurisdiction 
. . . over appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of agencies 
of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies." 
2 
legal training"—and are thus not "intuitively aware of the legal significance of terms 
such as "reasonable," "rational," or "rationale"3 (Appellees' Brief at 10)— 
The fact that the terminology might be construed to yield an inference that 
the Board applied an improper standard of review is really immaterial to 
the issue before the Court. So long as the procedure afforded to plaintiffs 
was "orderly, impartial, judicious and fundamentally fair," other procedural 
imperfections may properly be overlooked. 
Id. (quoting McBride v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 579 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991)). 
The fact remains, however, as Plaintiffs have already explained (Appellants' Brief 
at 13-19; see esp. p. 18) that the Board ignored the correctness standard mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-704(3),4 substituting in its place the wholly unwarranted 
"reasonableness" standard urged upon it by the city staff and the Board's legal 
counsel—the same which had originally labeled rentals of fewer than 30 days illegal. 
Contrary to statute, and thus illegal, this reasonableness standard also unjustifiably 
required Plaintiffs to "establish that the staff had no rational basis for its decision" 
(Record at 181), rather than that it had made a mistake, as mandated by statute. This 
improper burden certainly belies Defendants' claim that "the procedure afforded to 
plaintiffs was 'orderly, impartial, judicious and fundamentally fair'"; quite to the contrary, 
3
 "Intuition"—"direct perception of truth, fact, etc., independent of any reasoning 
process," Random House Webster's College Dictionary 709 (McGraw-Hill ed. 
1991)—has nothing to do with comprehension of common adjectives like "rational" or 
"reasonable"; nor indeed does legal training, of which Defendants self-deprecatingly 
admit their lack. Defendants' "intuitive awareness" of semantics—or its absence—is 
thus irrelevant. 
4
 An appellant before a board of adjustment bears "the burden of proving that an 
error has been made," Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-704(3); see also Sandy Land Code § 15-
5-8(B); that is, that the Staff made a mistake—not that their decision was irrational or 
unreasonable, but that it was wrong. The applicable standard is correctness. 
3 
it was adverse to established statutory order, noticeably biased, manifestly illegal, and 
patently unfair. Defendants' self-proclaimed ignorance of the law cannot excuse this. 
8. On Appeal, No Deference is Given to Board Decisions Alleged to be Illegal. 
Defendants spend four pages arguing that "board of adjustment decisions are 
afforded a presumption of validity." In support of this thesis, Defendants cite no fewer 
than eight times to Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Defendants' reliance on this case is, of course, somewhat ironic 
since Patterson makes abundantly clear the important distinction between the "arbitrary 
and capricious" standard—which does afford deference to board decisions—and the 
"illegal" standard—which permits no deference whatsoever. 
Patterson, it will be recalled, was an appeal from a Utah County Board of 
Adjustment approval of a request for a special zoning exception allowing a private 
airstrip. Mr. Patterson operated the Cedar Valley airport, a private, commercial airport a 
few miles from the site of the proposed private airstrip. Patterson appealed the board's 
approval, and the district court agreed, holding the board's decision arbitrary, 
capricious, and illegal. The two families seeking the special exception appealed. 
On appeal, this Court declared that a board of adjustment decision must "be 
rejected on appeal [1] if [it is] so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious or [2] if 
[it] violate[s] the law" Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis 
added).5 
5
 See also Wells v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 P.2d at 
1104-05 (analyzing the illegality of a grant of variance separately from arbitrariness and 
caprice: "the Board's actions are generally accorded substantial deference, if exercised 
within the boundaries established by the statute" (emphasis added)); accord Town of 
Beverly Shores v. Bagnall, 590 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (Indiana 1992) ("Such a standard 
naturally requires great deference toward the administrative board by the reviewing 
4 
In keeping with this bifurcated analysis, this Court's opinion in Patterson is 
expressly divided into two sections, one dealing with arbitrariness and caprice, id. at 
605-09, and another dealing specifically with illegality, id. at 609-10. Discussing the 
appropriate scope of review, the Patterson opinion explains that 
The Board will be found to have exercised its discretion within the proper 
boundaries unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Further, 
"[t]he court shall affirm the decision of the board . . . if the decision is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record." Together, these 
concepts mean that the Board's decision can only be considered arbitrary 
or capricious if not supported by substantial evidence. 
On the other hand, whether or not the Board's decision is illegal 
depends on a proper interpretation and application of the law. These are 
matters for [the Court's] determination . . . according] no deference to 
the district court or the Board. 
893 P.2d at 604 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708(6) (1991)) (emphasis added). 
Defendants, however, disingenuously argue that Plaintiffs have somehow wilfully 
wrenched Patterson's "no deference" language out of context: 
[P]rior to and following that sentence, the Patterson court spent four 
pages of discussion establishing "substantial deference" as the 
appropriate standard for reviewing a board of adjustment decision.6 For 
example, following the quoted sentence, the court notes that property 
owners hold their property subject to the police power by the legislative 
body and that the exercise of that police power in promoting public health, 
safety and welfare, is afforded a presumption of validity. 
court when the petition challenges findings of act or the application of the facts to the 
law. On the other hand, if the allegation is that the board committed an error of law, no 
such deference is afforded") 
6
 Actually, the Patterson Court spent fewer than two pages—seven paragraphs— 
on the appropriate standard of review (893 P.2d at 603-04). Defendants' assertion, 
however, seems to imply that somehow the Court's declaration that "we accord no 
deference to . . . the Board" in determining whether a board's decision is illegal, 893 
P.2d at 604, means exactly the opposite simply because deference was discussed 
elsewhere in the opinion as an element of a different standard. This is akin to reasoning 
that several paragraphs on the nature of life changes the meaning of "he's dead" to 
"he's alive." 
5 
(Appellees'Brief a\ 12-13 {citing Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606-07).) A careful—even a 
cursory—reading of Patterson, however, demonstrates that this is simply not true. Prior 
to the paragraph setting forth the illegality/no-deference standard, Judge Wilkins, 
writing for this Court, discussed the arbitrary and capricious standard, of which 
substantial deference forms an important element. It was in connection with this 
standard—not the illegality/no-deference standard—that Judge Wilkins explained, as 
Defendants stress, that "boards of adjustment should be given 'a comparatively wide 
latitude of discretion' and that their decisions should carry a presumption of 
correctness." (Appellees'Brief at 11 (citing Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603 n.4)); and that 
"'[i]t does not lie within the prerogative of the . . . court to substitute its judgment for that 
of the Board.'" (Id. (citing Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603 n.5).) Both of these citations, 
however, are to places preceding the Court's declaration that "proper interpretation and 
application of the law. . . . are matters for our determination, and we accord no 
deference to the district court or to the Board." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, although Defendants' point enthusiastically to Patterson's emphasis 
on police power and the promotion of health, safety, and welfare, this discussion 
appears in the section of the Patterson opinion entitled "Alleged Arbitrariness of the 
Board's Finding," 893 P.2d at 605 (emphasis added); it has nothing to do with illegality, 
and it is improper for Defendants to imply that it does. 
We reiterate, as this Court made clear in Patterson: "[Wjhether or not the 
Board's decision is illegal depends on a proper interpretation and application of the law. 
These are matters for our determination, and we accord no deference to the district 
court or the Board." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. 
6 
C. Defendants' Argument That the Board's Improper Affirmance of the Sandy 
Staff Decree Is "Compatible with the General Purposes of a Single Family 
Residential Zone" Is Specious and Irrelevant.7 
Defendants turn next to an argument stressing "compatibility] with the general 
purposefs] of a single family residential zone,"declaring it a "[fundamental. . . question 
before the Court. . . whether the short-term rental of single family dwellings on a nightly 
or weekly basis to transient guests is a use which is compatible with the general 
purpose of a single family residential zone." (Appellee's Brief at 16.)8 Actually, 
7
 Defendants preface their "general purposes" discussion with a two-page 
commentary on various canons of statutory construction (Appellee's Brief at 14-16), 
beginning with a statement that "[t]he rules of statutory construction are also applied in 
the context of interpretation of county and municipal ordinances." (Id. at 14.) In the 
present case, however, there is no ordinance to interpret. It is true that where a court 
cannot rely on the plain language of an ordinance—that is, "where there is an ambiguity 
or uncertainty in a portion of the statute," Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606—"it is proper to 
look to an entire act in order to discern its meaning and intent; and if it is reasonably 
susceptible of different interpretations, the one should be chosen which best 
harmonizes with its general purpose," id. (Defendants, unfortunately, fail to state the 
requirement of ambiguity or uncertainty.) But this is neither here nor there, for the 
canons of construction are entirely irrelevant to the present case: there is nothing here 
to construe: merely a vanilla zoning ordinance which says nothing at all about rental 
(short-term or long-), and an autocratic board of adjustment ruling pulling a 30-day 
minimum rental out of thin air. 
Defendants' discussion of the canons, and their evident wish thereby to focus 
the Court's attention on "compatibility" and "general purposes" is clearly an attempt to 
bestow relevance on their arguments concerning "intangible social values": they have 
no ordinance to construe, and thus essay instead to tout intangible policy 
considerations. Such policy decisions are properly left in the hands of the elected 
legislature (the City Council) rather than usurped by the minor functionaries of a low-
level administrative board. Both Defendants' discussion, and its "canons of 
construction" preface are thus at best irrelevancies, at worst, disingenuous paper tigers 
leading far afield from the matters truly at issue. 
8
 At this point, Defendants insert a paragraph concerning the scope of the police 
power. "It is ample," they declare (Appellees' Brief at 17 (quoting Village of Belle Terre 
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974))), "to lay out zones where family values, youth values, 
and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for 
people." Plaintiffs wholeheartedly agree, although they are unable to see the relevance 
of this quotation to the present dispute, since Sandy City has not exercised its police 
power: no ordinance has been passed; no legislative body convened; no debates held; 
7 
however, far from being a "fundamental question," short-term rental's "compatibility] 
with the general purpose of a single family residential zone" is a complete irrelevancy 
which the Court should not even address. 
As Plaintiffs pointed out in their original Brief, "[i]n the interpretation of statutory 
language . . . . '[the courts] must be guided by the law as it is . . . . When language is 
clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left 
for construction.'" Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 
1995) {quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P. 377, 379-80 (Utah 1921)); see also CIG 
Exploration v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995) ("'[w]hen 
faced with a question of statutory construction, [the courts] look first to the plain 
language of the statute. Only if [they] find some ambiguity need [they] look further," 
citations omitted); City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 29 (Utah 
1996) ("[o]nly when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek 
guidance from . . . policy consideration^]," citations omitted). {Appellants' Brief at 
29-30.) Defendants agree that the language of the Sandy Development Code is 
unambiguous {see Appellees' Brief at 25 ("The City . . . has reviewed the unambiguous 
language of the entire Development Code")), and cannot inconsistently argue that the 
Court must look beyond unambiguous language9 to generalized policy considerations. 
no vote taken. Defendants assertion that "limits on transient occupancy of single family 
residential dwellings are not unconstitutional" {Appellees' Brief at 17 {citing Cope v. City 
of Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d 1083 (Or. 1993))), is completely irrelevant, since both Belle 
Terre and Cope dealt with challenges to properly passed zoning ordinances rather than 
with the sort of ex nihilo emperor's-new-clothes sort of decree made by the Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment. 
9
 It would help, of course, if there were an ordinance whose unambiguous 
language the Court might examine. Obviously, if there were an ordinance, the Court 
would look first to it, and if it found the ordinance ambiguous would turn to its policy 
8 
D. Defendants' Reliance on Ewing Is Misplaced. 
/. Ewing is fundamentally different from the case at bar. The reason for 
Defendants' lengthy aside on general purpose statements and policy considerations 
becomes clear as Defendants' argument moves to an examination of the superficially 
similar Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), 
upon which they heavily rely. (Appellees' Brief at 17-18.) In Ewing, the city of Carmel-
by-the-Sea had passed a zoning ordinance prohibiting "transient commercial use of 
residential property for remuneration for less than 30 consecutive days." 286 Cal. Rptr. 
at 383. (The fact that Carmel-by-the-Sea had passed an ordinance at all immediately 
and completely distinguishes the present case—wherein no such ordinance 
exists—from Ewing—in which one did.) In any case, challenged as an unconstitutional 
taking, the Carmel ordinance was upheld by the California Court of Appeals as 
constitutional. The court, pointing out that "[although no precise rule determines when 
property has been taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and 
public interests," 286 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (citations omitted), naturally examined the 
Findings and Purposes appended to the Carmel ordinance:10 
language. Defendants, however, illogically argue that the Court should ignore the fact 
that there is no ordinance and proceed directly to analyze policy language—language 
which the Court may look to only after analysis of statutory language. 
(It should be noted here that, aside from various question-begging assertions 
which simply repeat Sandy's litany that "short-term rental" is not in sync with a 
"residential environment" (see Record at 181-82; Appellants' Brief at 15-16 n.2), 
Defendants have never presented any evidence that "short-term rental" frustrates the 
policies behind Sandy's R-1 zoning ordinances.) 
10
 Note that the California Court of Appeals examined the purposes behind the 
Carmel ordinance so as to appropriately weigh the interests of the public against the 
interests of the plaintiff landholders—not, as Sandy would have it, because an 
examination of the purpose clause is somehow necessary to the application of an 
unambiguous ordinance (assuming there were one to apply). 
9 
In the Findings and Purposes appended to Ordinance No. 89-17, the City 
Council observed: "The purpose of the R-1 District is to provide an 
appropriately zoned land area within the City for permanent single-family 
residential uses and structures and to enhance and maintain the 
residential character of the City." The Council found that the use of 
single-family residential property for transient lodging was a commercial 
use inconsistent with the purpose of the R-1 district. 
286 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (emphasis added). It should be noted that Carmel's city 
council—not its board of adjustment or city staff—had passed an actual ordinance 
restricting rentals of fewer than 30 days in residential zones. The ordinance, by the 
way, was passed by way of implementing the goals set forth in the 1988 Revised 
General Plan of Carmel-by-the-Sea, one of the specific policy goals of which stated 
"Review and develop measures to restrict commercial short term rental of single family 
residences in the R-1 district." 286 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 
The more one examines Ewing, the less germane it appears to the present case: 
a series of policy goals, including a specific design to separate tourists from residential 
areas11 is drawn up in a revised general municipal plan; based upon the policies 
enunciated in the plan, the city council investigates the situation and formulates a series 
of findings; these findings become the basis of a properly passed ordinance, which, 
challenged as an unconstitutional taking, is upheld as nothing of the sort. 
Sandy, in contrast, has drawn up no policy goals concerning the present issue; 
the City Council has taken no steps to investigate or formulate findings; and no 
ordinance has been passed (so it can hardly be challenged as an unconstitutional 
taking). Defendants may argue that the Court should look to the superficial similarity 
between the language of the Carmel city council's findings and the Sandy City Staffs 
11
 "Blessed with unparalleled geography, climate, beauty, and charm, Carmel 
naturally attracts numerous short-term visitors." 286 Cal. Rptr. at 389. 
10 
authoritarian proclamation, and ignore the fact that there is no ordinance, but such 
reasoning is akin to the classic comedy sketch about the man awaiting the birth of his 
new baby, who carefully prepares everything weeks in advance, and then efficiently 
heads off for the hospital without his wife. In both cases, despite outward show, the 
essential element is missing. Having a zoning ordinance is rather indispensable to 
getting one upheld: the declarations of Sandy's Board of Adjustment are no substitute 
for the properly passed city ordinance which Sandy's City Council never passed. 
#7. "Residence" has nothing to do with duration of occupancy. Defendants 
also point to Ewing in declaring that the key to their 30-day limitation is the concept of 
"residence" (see Appellees' Brief at 22-23): 
Generally [say Defendants], where a person resides at a location with the 
intent to remain for an extended period, that is his residence.... One who 
rents a house on a month-to-month basis generally intends to reside at 
that house for more than the term of the rental.... 
Where an individual rents a single family dwelling for a night, a 
week, or even a month, with the intent to return to his permanent place of 
residence at the end of the rental term, he can hardly be termed a 
"resident"... as that concept is normally understood. 
Id. Defendants have here fallen into the same semantic snare in which the city of 
Portland became entangled in City of Portland v. Carriage Inn, 676 P.2d 943 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1984). There, it will be recalled, the city sought to enjoin "transient occupancy" of 
an apartment building, arguing that "residential" should be interpreted to mean "the act 
or fact of abiding or dwelling in a place for some time." Id. at 944 (quoting Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 1931 (1976)). The court rejected Portland's 
argument, pointing out that the Portland zoning ordinances described as "residential" 
both hotels, in which one may stay for a single night, and residential health care 
facilities, in which one might stay for "for a period ranging from days to months." Id. at 
11 
944-45. Given the lack of duration requirements anywhere in the Portland Code, the 
Carriage Inn court concluded that "residential.., differentiate^] those uses involving 
living arrangements for persons from other types of uses such as commercial, 
manufacturing and farming, rather than to distinguish long-term from short-term 
occupancy." Id. at 945. 
Like Portland's code in Carriage Inn, Sandy's code lacks any duration 
requirement whatsoever, and employs the term "residential" without reference to term of 
occupancy. (Indeed, ironically, Sandy's code definition of "residential health care 
facility" contains the selfsame omission of duration requirements which the Carriage Inn 
court found fatal to its "residence" argument.) The Board of Adjustment cannot simply 
create a duration requirement of thin air. 
E. Defendants Cannot Discredit Plaintiffs' Cases. 
Defendants assert that "[tjhe case law cited by [Plaintiffs] is not controlling in the 
case at bar" (Appellees'Brief at 19), and then proceed—very briefly—to attempt to 
distinguish the cases discussed in Plaintiffs' Brief. 
Defendants declare that State ex rei Harding v. Door County Board of 
Adjustment 371 N.W.2d 403 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), "deals with ownership and 
occupancy of a single family dwelling by 13 families, not transient tenancy.... the 
owners would have long-term interest in the properties, even though their period of 
tenancy might be periodic rather than continuous." (Appellees' Brief at 19.) Actually, 
however, the 13 families in Door County had each purchased the right to occupy the 
dwelling for four weeks out of the year. That's 28 days apiece per year—as many or 
fewer days than many of Plaintiffs' tenants. Plaintiffs must admit to being rather 
12 
confused by Defendants' arguments: first, they argue that "short-term rental" leads to 
various negative ends, such as "strangers, constantly changing, in their neighborhoods . 
. . [and] no ability to develop community relationships with occupants." (Record at 
182.) Then, in support of this thesis, Defendants argue that 
Short-term tenants have little interest in public agencies or in the welfare 
of [community] citizenry. They do not participate in local government, 
coach little league, or join the hospital guild. They do not lead a Scout 
troop, volunteer at the library, or keep an eye on an elderly neighbor. 
Literally, they are here today and gone tomorrow—without engaging in the 
sort of activities that weld and strengthen a community. 
(Appellees'Brief at 18 (quoting Ewing, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 388).) But now, suddenly, 
Defendants argue that a 28-day tenancy perfectly satisfies all of these criteria; so long 
as the tenant is an owner. But why is that? Ownership is irrelevant to the various 
policies touted by Defendants: owners who occupy a house for only 28 days, like their 
renting counterparts, don't participate in local government either, or coach little league 
or lead scout troops. "But," Defendants will repeat, "'the owners would have long-term 
interest in the properties, even though their period of tenancy might be periodic rather 
than continuous.'" (Appellees' Brief at 19 (emphasis added).) They would? Is it 
because the owner comes back yearly? They certainly don't have to. Presumably, any 
one (or all) of the 13 families in Door County might never use their vacation home or 
ever return; they might even let friends or relatives use the home in their stead. 
Carriage Inn, say Defendants, is inconsistent with Plaintiffs' argument 
(Appellees' Brief at 19): 
Even if it is still true that a zoning law or ordinance, being in derogation of 
the common law rights of property owners, should be strictly construed in 
their favor, the primary function of the courts is to discern and declare the 
intent of the legislative body. 
13 
Id. (quoting Carriage Inn, 676 P.2d at 944 (Defendants' emphasis)).12 This statement, 
however, is directly in keeping with Plaintiffs' position: Plaintiffs agree completely that 
zoning ordinances must be strictly construed in favor of property owners; nor have 
Plaintiffs any problem with the function of the courts; Defendants, however, have no 
ordinance from which to "discern and declare the intent of the legislative body." Sandy 
never passed one. 
Strauss v. Zoning Hearing Board ofHaverford Township, 608 A.2d 1105 (Pa. 
Cmwith. Ct. 1992), the rationale of which Defendants say does not apply here, was not 
cited by Plaintiffs for its factual similarity, but as an examination of the definition of 
"family." An important point, given Defendants' emphasis on "single-family use." (See 
Record at 181-82; Appellees' Brief at 1 & 5-7.)13 
Finally, Defendants attack Plaintiffs' discussion of Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame 
Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Plaintiffs, as they have already explained, 
are perfectly well aware that Ben Hame "differs significantly in a number of crucial 
respects" (Appellants' Brief at 26), but the analysis in Judge Bench's well-reasoned 
dissenting opinion—touching as it does on a number of points bearing on the issues in 
12
 Defendants wisely say nothing else about Carriage Inn, since it works so 
strongly in favor of Plaintiffs' position. (See p. 11, supra.) 
13
 Defendants maintain that "If a single family residence were rented for two 
weeks to a traditional family—father, mother and accompanying children—the use 
would nonetheless be prohibited as a rental for 30 days or less." (Appellees' Brief at 20 
(footnote omitted).) Oddly, of course, given Defendants' analysis under Ewing and 
Door County, a two-week time-share would be perfectly permissible. 
14 
the present case—is certainly worth examination; indeed, omission of the case from a 
discussion of short-term rental would be an astonishing oversight.14 
Point 3 
RENTAL, AN INHERENT PROPERTY RIGHT, CANNOT BE PROSCRIBED FOR 
LACK OF SPECIFIC PERMISSION IN ZONING ORDINANCES. 
Defendants present a nutshell summary of their entire argument as Section III of 
their Brief: 
[Plaintiffs] argue that the Development Code is unambiguous and that the 
City's interpretation reads into the Code language which is not there. 
They urge the Court to apply strict construction to this unambiguous 
language of a very small portion of the Development Code, excluding any 
other applicable language in the Code, to reach the conclusion they seek. 
. . . . They don't want the entire Development Code to be applicable 
to them. 
The City, by contrast, has reviewed the unambiguous language of 
the entire Development Code to conclude that because [Plaintiffs'] use of 
the residential dwelling units is not expressly permitted by the 
Development Code, it is prohibited. 
(Appellees' Brief at 25.)15 Plaintiffs, however, are as eager that the entire Code be 
enforced as Defendants claim to be. Plaintiffs have not focused, as Defendants assert, 
on "a very small portion of the Development Code"; to the contrary, Plaintiffs assure the 
14
 Plaintiffs do not wish to sound petulant, but they find Defendants' declaration 
that Judge Bench's dissent "is clearly not controlling law in this matter" (Appellees' Brief 
at 20), both unnecessary (it is, after all, a dissent— its status is obvious) and 
inconsistent. Defendants' reliance on Ewing, a markedly dissimilar decision by the 
California court of appeals, is certainly not binding upon the Court either. The 
reasoning, however, of a seasoned Utah Appellate Court Judge, even (perhaps 
especially) in dissent, is manifestly as persuasive as Ewing—probably moreso. 
15
 Defendants and Plaintiffs agree that the language of the language of the 
Sandy Land Code is unambiguous (see page 8, supra). 
15 
Court that they have closely examined Sandy's Land Code cover to cover: they have 
found no limitation on rental anywhere.16 
Defendants, however, as can be clearly seen from their summation, above, base 
their argument upon § 15-21-11 of the Sandy Land Code: "[N]o building . . . shall be . . . 
used or occupied for any use except those uses specifically permitted . . . ." But rental 
is not a "use"—any more than is a life estate, an undivided interest, a profit-a-prendre, 
or a right of survivorship—for a leasehold is an estate in land, See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Hansen, 594 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah 1979) (denominating a leasehold an "estate"); 49 
Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 19 & 20 (1995); Black's Law Dictionary 549 
"ESTATE FOR YEARS" and 890 "LEASEHOLD" (6th ed. 1990), and the right to transfer an 
estate or any portion thereof to another is an incident of ownership, Trustees of Phillips 
Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 33 A.2d 665, 673 (N.H. 1943), quoted in Black's Law 
Dictionary 1106 "OWNERSHIP" (6th ed. 1990).17 Section 15-21-11 of the Sandy Land 
Code, in other words, is irrelevant. 
Besides, the very idea that everything not expressly permitted is therefore 
proscribed borders on absurdity. The ordinances say nothing about garage sales 
either, or about babysitting, fixing cars, backyard barbecues, or children's lemonade 
stands. May the Sandy City Staff forbid these? What if Sandy residents began having 
lots of garage sales? Could the Staff outlaw garage sales as a non-residential 
business? Is fixing a car in one's driveway prohibitted? Can a family have a backyard 
16
 And obviously, neither has Sandy City, since none is set forth in its brief. 
17
 This is all basic property law, of course: principles of ownership and tenancy 
so ancient that they are taken as well established as far back as Magna Charta {see 
chap. XXVII therein). 
16 
barbecue? Are children permitted to run lemonade stands in front of their homes? 
None of these is "expressly permitted" by the Code; by Defendants' reasoning, people 
would need to apply for licenses to do almost anything—for it is obvious that the Sandy 
Land Code leaves out more "uses" than it could possibly include. 
That Defendants are quite comfortable with the extremity of their position is really 
rather frightening: Inalienable, Constitutionally protected property rights suddenly 
become mere "uses" subject to the supposedly unreviewable, irreversible decrees of an 
obscure municipal board. Can the Board of Adjustment ban rental of fewer than three 
months? Six months? Twelve? Can they proscribe rental altogether? That would 
certainly seem to be the logical end-result of their emphasis on long-term community 
interests, responsibility and accountability of occupants, "constantly changing . . . 
neighborhoods," and "no ability to develop community relationships." Taken to its 
logical extreme, in fact, Defendants' radical premise permits the City Staff—the City 
Council wouldn't even need to convene—to set a minimum duration for owner 
occupancy; to require City approval of potential buyers before one could sell one's 
house; even to outlaw transfer of real property entirely.18 
18
 Defendants will, of course, accuse Plaintiffs of presenting a "parade of 
horribles," of arguing a slippery slope, etc. Actually, Plaintiffs feel they have stopped far 
short of where full-blown reductio ad absurdam would lead if given its lead: licensure of 
all activities outside the home, including family barbecues, block parties, little-league 
games, funerals; houses of all the same design or set of designs; designated housing, 
perhaps, with specific numbers of bedrooms per family by number of children; required 
notice to the city and one's neighbors before being granted permission to move; maybe 
even entailment of property so that the community might be assured that those 
neighbors it feels are assets will remain where they are and not give place to 
"undesirables." Granted, including such nightmarish scenarios would be overdoing 
things: it sounds like an admixture of the Aristocratic snobbery one reads about in Jane 
Austen coupled with the bleak totalitarianism of Orwell's 1984. 
Plaintiffs are hopeful that such scenes remain as outrageous as they sound. 
17 
In short, returning to the matter at hand, Plaintiffs need not, as Defendants would 
have it, "demonstrate! ] that their use of residential dwelling units for short-term rentals 
is specifically permitted by the Development Code." (Appellees' Brief at 26.) The "use" 
remains residential whether for one week, a month, a year, or a century. 
Point 4 
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT EXCEEDED ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
A. The Board's Actions did Exceed its Authority. 
Defendants wish the Court to believe that 
the Board of Adjustment merely entertained an appeal from a decision 
interpreting and applying a zoning ordinance, as provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9-704. Its action was clearly within the scope of the enabling 
statutes. There is no support for the proposition that the Board's 
affirmation of the Staffs interpretation was somehow a legislative act 
which created a new zoning classification. It is unreasonable to conclude 
that the Board exceeded its authority. 
(Appellees' Brief at 26.) This is Defendants' entire response to Plaintiffs' argument on 
the subject (see Appellants' Brief at 30-32), which Defendants label "superficial" (see 
Appellees' Brief at 26). Defendants cite no cases in support. And their "argument" is 
little more than a circular request for the Court to determine that the Sandy Board did 
not exceed its authority because it would be unreasonable to do so; to determine that it 
would be unreasonable to do so because there is no support for it; and that there is no 
support for it because the Board merely entertained an appeal—an action clearly "within 
the scope of the enabling statutes" (i.e., because its action did not exceed its authority)! 
The reality of the situation is of course somewhat more serious than Defendants' 
ring-around-the-rosy syllogism makes it appear. Prior to the Board of Adjustment's 
affirmance of the City Staff decree that rentals might no longer last fewer than 30 days, 
18 
there was no such provision in the Sandy Land Code. Afterwards—according to the 
Board, anyway—there was.19 The real syllogism of this case runs as follows: Sandy's 
Code was changed as a result of the actions of the City Staff and the Board of 
Adjustment. Only legislative action can change a code. Ergo, Sandy's Staff and Board 
of Adjustment engaged in legislative activity. And legislative activity exceeds the 
powers of any Board of Adjustment... even Sandy's. 
B. The Board's 30-Day Rental Limitation Rendered the Zoning Ordinances 
Unconstitutionally Vague. 
Defendants label "analytical sleight of hand" Plaintiffs' claims that the Board's 
improperly legislative actions have rendered Sandy's zoning ordinances 
unconstitutionally vague. (Appellees' Brief at 27.) Defendants' argument—again a 
single paragraph without case-law support—states that "The issue of vagueness and its 
constitutional implications apply to statutes and ordinances, not to interpetations or 
applications of those statutes or ordinances." (Appellees' Brief at 26.) Defendants are 
fatally mistaken. Ordinances, like statutes, may be challenged for unconstitutional 
vagueness either facially or as applied.20 To show vagueness as applied, one need 
only demonstrate that the ordinance provides inadequate notice. Greenwood v. City of 
19
 Although, of course, no one else can see this new provision anywhere: only 
the Staff and the Board. 
20
 Defendants seem to realize this, but at the same time apparently hold the 
incongruent notion that all vagueness is facial—that it can only appear in passing an 
ordinance, not in its application: 
Plaintiffs have not challenged the constitutionality of the zoning 
ordinances in question, either facially or as applied to their circumstances. 
Rather, they cite case law addressing vagueness of statutes and make 
the quantum leap in logic that an interpretation of a statute equates to 
passing an unconstitutionally vague statute. 
(Appellees' Briefat 26-27.) 
19 
North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1991). This, Plaintiffs have shown, for 
Sandy's code provides nowhere the slightest hint that rentals of fewer than 30 days are 
prohibited, to say nothing of providing adequate notice. (See Appellants' Brief at 
33-35.) The application of the single-family residential zoning designation to prohibit 
short-term residential use by single families without any language prohibiting short-term 
residential use is unconstitutionally vague. No person reading Sandy City's zoning 
ordinances could possibly determine that a short-term residential use is prohibited. For 
this reason alone, the Board's ruling must be reversed. 
Point 5 
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM "INTERPRETING" 
THEIR ORDINANCES TO PROSCRIBE SHORT-TERM RENTALS. 
"Let justice be done, though the heavens fair 
—Lord Mansfield21 
Finally, Defendants attack Plaintiffs estoppel claims. The Supreme Court, in 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Division of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 
1994), set forth the factual predicates of equitable estoppel: 
21
 Cited in Utah State University, etc. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 n.3 (Utah 
1982), wherein the Court explained that 
Notwithstanding our approval of th[e] rule [that estoppel generally is not 
assertable against the government or governmental institutions], like most 
general rules, there are exceptions when its rigid application would defeat, 
rather than serve, the higher purpose that all rules are intended to serve: 
that of doing justice.... [W]hen it is plainly apparent that its application 
would result in injustice, and there would be no substantial adverse effect 
on public policy, the courts will honor the higher purpose of doing justice 
by invoking the exception, rather than departing from that desired 
objective in slavish adherence to a general rule. 
Sutro, 646 P.2d at 718 (footnotes omitted; but see footnote 4, in which the Court points 
out "[t]hat courts are increasingly applying this exception, consistent with the trend 
toward holding the government and its agencies more responsible for their actions." Id. 
at718n.4.). 
20 
1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards 
asserted, 
2) Action by the other party in reliance on such admission, statement, or act, 
and 
3) Injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act. 
See Consolidation Coal Co., 886 P.2d at 522 (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990) {quoting Celebrity 
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n., 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)). When a 
party seeks to estop the state, two more requirements are added: 
4) Injustice would result if the state were not estopped,22 and 
5) Estoppel would work no substantial adverse effect on public policy. 
Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at 522 (citing Plateau Mining, 802 P.2d at 728; Utah State 
University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982); and United States v. 
Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 735-37 (1824)).23 
22
 This, in fact, is the principal element in considering estoppel against a 
government agency: "In cases where such an issue arises," said the Sutro Court, "the 
critical inquiry is whether it appears that the facts may be found with such certainty, and 
the inustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Sutro, 646 
P.2d at 720 (emphasis added). "And," the Court continued, "in case there is doubt on 
such matters, it should be resolved in favor of permitting . . . trial of the issue, as 
opposed to summary rejection thereof." Id. 
23
 Defendants insert as another necessary element a showing that "the exercise 
of governmental powers would not be impaired." (Appellee's Brief at 27.) Exhaustive 
review of the cases cited by Defendants, however, fails to verify the existence of this 
particular element. Plaintiffs are loth to argue Defendants' case for them; however, the 
appropriate citation for this element would be to Mendez v. State Department of Social 
Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). But Mendez makes it abundantly 
clear that the "impairment of governmental powers" element is simply a restatement of 
the better-known "adverse effect on public policy" element; for the cases which mention 
the former omit the latter, and vice-versa. 
Defendants also seek to add a requirement that one who seeks estoppel must 
show "exceptional circumstances." (Appellee's Brief ai 28 (quoting Ben Hame, 836 
21 
Here, of course, all five elements are fully satisfied: Plaintiffs have purchased, 
rented, and made arrangements to rent their homes in reliance on repeated assurances 
from agents of Sandy City that there was no impediment in the City's ordinances to the 
rental of their homes for fewer than 30 days, one such guarantee coming directly from 
the zoning administrator, Brok Armantrout, himself.24 (See Record at 249; Appellants' 
Brief at 35-37.) Allowing Defendants now to repudiate these assurances on the basis 
of an imaginary ordinance illegally dreamed up by a board of adjustment with no policy-
making or legislative power whatsoever would be an injustice of the gravest 
sort—unabashedly depriving landholders of their property rights without the slightest 
justification in statute, precedent, or regulation, on the flimsy and self-contradictory 
P.2d at 803).) The "exceptional circumstances" language came into Utah law from 
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (quoted in Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 
136, 138 (Utah 1976)); the Ben Name Court, however, made it clear that the required 
"exceptional circumstances" are simply the five elements outlined above, see Ben 
Harne, 836 P.2d at 802-03 "Equitable Estoppel" (citing, e.g., Utah County v. Young, 
615 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Utah 1980); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 
P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)): 
[Defendant] has shown neither an act or omission by [Plaintiff] justifying 
good faith reliance nor a substantial detrimental change in . . . position in 
reliance on [Plaintiffs] acts. Hence, [Defendant] has not shown any 
exceptional circumstances constituting an estoppel defense.... 
Ben Hame, 836 P.2d at 803. The Court's logic is clear: failure to show the necessary 
elements (here listed as (1) an act or omission, (2) justifying good-faith reliance, and (3) 
a substantial detrimental change in position (including "incurring extensive expenses," 
id.)) equals failure to satisfy the "exceptional circumstances" requirement; and as the 
discussion prior to the above-quoted conclusion makes clear, the two may in fact be 
equated: satisfaction of the necessary estoppel elements is a showing of exceptional 
circumstances, especially when coupled with the two elements necessary for estoppel 
against the government. 
24
 The fact that Brok Armantrout made such assurances refutes Defendants' 
groundless assertions that Plaintiffs relied merely on an "over-the-counter inquiry . . . 
from a clerk or ministerial officer who does not have authority to deviate from the 
applicable zoning ordinances." (Appellees' Brief at 29.) Mr. Armantrout holds no such 
low-ranking position; his word as Sandy City's zoning administrator is plainly sufficiently 
authoritative to bind the City. 
22 
excuse that they were lawfully doing what landholders everywhere have every right to 
do after Sandy City's Board of Adjustment had autocratically changed its mind (without 
bothering to consult the City Council). 
Estoppel against Sandy City and its Board of Adjustment, finally, would have no 
adverse effect on public policy: requiring a city to abide by the law, including its own 
ordinances, can hardly be considered a detrimental policy. It is, in addition, not an 
adverse policy to require the law to be predictable and comprehensible, that city 
ordinances be properly passed and written down before they are enforced, and that the 
legislative power remain in the hands of the legislative body, rather than in the whims of 
minor executive functionaries. 
As for Defendants' declaration that "[s]imply failing to enforce a zoning ordinance 
for period of time does not suffice to estop future enforcement" (Appellees' Brief at 28 
(citing Ben Hame, 836 P.2d at 803)), Plaintiffs reiterate that Sandy City has no 
ordinance limiting rentals to fewer than 30 days; nor has it ever had one. (See 
Appellants' Brief at 36.) So, while failure to enforce may not estop enforcement, failure 
to enact most certainly does. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants would have the Court believe that a city staff can improperly 
determine policy, illegally create law, dupe the board of adjustment into supporting, 
acquiescing in, even adopting, its usurpation of legislative authority, and can then sit 
back secure in the knowledge that the courts cannot overturn its autocratic decrees, but 
must instead submissively defer. The Sandy City Council has opted not to pass any 
ordinances limiting rental to fewer than 30 days, and the Staff and the Board of 
23 
Adjustment cannot come along behind the City Council "interpreting" nonexistent 
provisions into being by decree. 
For these reasons, as discussed herein and in Plaintiffs original Brief, Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that the March 20,1996, decision of the Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment must be reversed. 
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